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CONTRACT AND KOMPETENZ 
BY 
Peter B. Rutledge* 
 
I.         INTRODUCTION  
 
 In October Term 2009, the Supreme Court decided a series of important 
cases involving arbitration.1 Two of those most important decisions were Rent-A-
Center, Inc. v. Jackson and Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp. At first 
glance, these two cases appear to have remarkably little in common. Rent-A-Center 
concerns the power of the arbitrator to resolve challenges to his jurisdiction. Stolt-
Nielsen concerns the tribunal’s ability to order classwide arbitration where the 
agreement is silent on the matter.  Indeed though both decisions were decided in 
the same term by the same majority of justices, Rent-A-Center (the later-issued 
option) does not even cite Stolt-Nielsen. 
 At another theoretical level, however, both cases implicate overlapping 
values. Specifically, both cases address the relationship between contract and the 
arbitrator’s decisionmaking authority (kompetenz). That relationship has several 
facets. One facet is the parties’ freedom to allocate decisionmaking authority 
between arbitrators and courts (what I term “procedural contractual freedom”).  
Another facet is the arbitrator’s authority to fill gaps in the parties’ arbitration 
agreements. Rent-A-Center, then, is a case about the limits on the parties’ 
procedural contractual freedom. Do limits exist on the parties’ ability to reallocate 
from a court to an arbitrator the power to rule on jurisdictional challenges? Stolt-
                                                 
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Georgia School of Law.  Visiting Fulbright 
Professor, Universitaet Wien, Institut fuer Zivilverfahrensrecht. I would like to thank Dean 
Rebecca White for her generous financial support of my research and the Institut fuer 
Zivilverfahrensrecht for providing an office, secretary and other essential support during 
my stint in Austria. Amanda Holcomb, a second-year student at the University of Georgia 
Law School, provided first-class research assistance. 
1 In addition to the ones analyzed here, others include Granite Rock Co. v. Int’l Bhd. of 
Teamsters, 130 S. Ct. 2847 (2010); Union Pac. R.R. Co. v.  Bhd. of Locomotive Eng’rs and 
Trainmen Gen. Comm. of Adjustment, Cent. Region, 130 S. Ct. 584 (2009). 
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Nielsen is a case about incomplete exercises in procedural contractual freedom.  
Do limits exist on the arbitrators’ discretion to render a procedural (or substantive) 
decision when the parties have unambiguously expressed their desire to arbitrate 
but have not expressly regulated a procedural matter in their arbitration agreement? 
 Elsewhere, Chris Drahozal and I have examined these cases in terms of 
what they reveal about procedural contracts (that is, agreements under which the 
parties regulate the procedures by which their disputes will be resolved).2 That 
article considers both the empirical practice (based on a dataset of credit card 
agreements deposited with the Federal Reserve) and draws some tentative 
normative conclusions. Building on that work, this essay sketches out two 
normative propositions.3 First, I defend a strong form of procedural contractual 
freedom. This flows from a conception of autonomy and social welfare that 
underlie general contract theory. Second, I defend a strong form of gapfilling 
authority by arbitrators with respect to matters where the arbitration agreement is 
silent. This gapfilling authority flows from the same conception of procedural 
contractual freedom: Judicial deference to arbitrators’ gapfilling authority respects 
the parties’ mutual intentions based on their threshold decision to arbitrate.  
Viewed through this lens, Rent-A-Center was rightly decided, but Stolt-Nielsen 
was not. The lens on the cases brings into relief unexplored tensions in the cases 
that their common majorities fails to recognize. Those underlying tensions will 
complicate efforts to resolve a host of important, unresolved questions in 
arbitration theory and practice. 
 This essay develops the foregoing thesis in three parts. Part II provides the 
essential background on Rent-A-Center and Stolt-Nielsen. It also places those 
decisions in the larger context of arbitration doctrine. Part III develops a normative 
                                                 
2 Christopher R. Drahozal & Peter B. Rutledge, Contract and Procedure, __ MARQ. L. 
REV. __ (forthcoming 2011). 
3 In an abundance of caution, I make clear that, though the views expressed here build on 
the joint work that Professor Drahozal and I have undertaken, the views expressed here are 
solely my own. 
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framework for thinking about parties’ ability to regulate the procedures by which 
their disputes will be resolved. Part IV applies that framework to the issues at stake 
in Rent-A-Center and Stolt-Nielsen. It also considers the implications of this 





 The factual backgrounds to Rent-A-Center and Stolt-Nielsen have been discussed 
elsewhere and, thus, do not warrant comprehensive re-examination here.4 This section 
provides only the background essential to my broader argument and places both cases in a 
broader doctrinal and empirical context. 
 
A.  Rent-A-Center 
 
 Rent-A-Center arose from an arbitration agreement used by a company 
with its prospective employees. Rent-A-Center required its prospective employees 
to sign the five-page agreement as a condition of employment. Among other 
things, the agreement allocated to the arbitrator the “exclusive authority to resolve 
any dispute relating to the interpretation, applicability, enforceability or formation 
of [the arbitration agreement] including, but not limited to any claim that all or any 
part of the [arbitration agreement] is void or voidable.”5 
 Such a clause is commonly referred to as a “delegation clause.” The clause 
is so named because it attempts to exploit a wrinkle in the United States law 
                                                 
4 See, e.g., David S. Schwartz, Claims-Suppressing Arbitration: The New Rules, 87 IND. 
L.J. __ (forthcoming 2012); Karen Halverson Cross, Letting the Arbitrator Decide 
Unconscionability Challenges, 26 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. (forthcoming 2011); 
Richard A. Nagareda, The Litigation-Arbitration Dichotomy Meets the Class Action, 86 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. (forthcoming 2011); Melissa Hart, Business-Like: The Supreme 
Court’s 2009-2010 Labor and Employment Decisions, 14 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 207, 
216-219 (2010). 
5 Rent-A-Center v. Jackson, 130 S. Ct. 2772, 2775 (2010). 
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governing the parties’ ability to delegate to the arbitrator the power to rule on 
challenges to his jurisdiction. That idea typically is described in the literature as the 
principle of kompetenz-kompetenz.6 Unlike several other countries, such as France 
and Germany, the Federal Arbitration Act does not explicitly regulate that 
principle.7 Nonetheless, in First Options v. Kaplan, the Supreme Court sought to 
address this lacuna in the legislation. Under First Options, courts presumptively 
resolve challenges to the validity of the arbitration agreement while arbitrators 
resolve challenges to the validity of the underlying contract.8 This presumptive 
allocation of authority, however, merely operates as a default rule (which, 
effectively, operates to fill a gap in the parties’ procedural contract). Where there is 
“clear and unmistakable evidence” that the parties intended to allocate to the 
arbitrator the power to resolve challenges to the validity of the arbitration 
agreement, courts must defer to that determination (and consequently await an 
award before intervening in the matter).9 Thus, a delegation clause such as the one 
at issue in Rent-A-Center attempts to exploit this exception to the First Options 
                                                 
6 See, e.g., William W. Park, The Arbitrability Dicta in First Options v. Kaplan: What Sort 
of Kompetenz-Kompetenz Has Crossed the Atlantic, 12 ARB. INT’L 137 (1996).  
7 Other countries’ approaches vary widely.  Under French law, for example, the arbitrator 
has the sole power to resolve jurisdictional challenges, and courts become involved only 
after an award has been rendered. See generally William W. Park, Determining Arbitral 
Jurisdiction: Allocating Tasks between Courts and Arbitrators, 8 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 133 
(1997) (discussing French law). By contrast, under German law, both the arbitrator and 
courts can resolve jurisdictional challenges in parallel and the arbitration can be stayed 
while the judicial challenge is pending. See German Code of Civil Procedure (ZPO) para. 
1032. This reflects one of the few modifications that Germany made to the UNCITRAL 
Model Arbitration Law, under which explicitly allows arbitration to proceed while a 
jurisdictional challenge is pending before a national court. See UNCITRAL Model 
Arbitration Law Art. 8. 
8 First Options of Chi., Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938 (1995). In other cases, the Court has 
elaborated on this general gapfilling principle. Courts resolve claims that the underlying 
agreement was never formed. Granite Rock Co. v. Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, 130 S. Ct. 2847, 
2856 (2010). Arbitrators resolve challenges that the underlying agreement is illegal. 
Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440, 449 (2006).  Other cases have 
elaborated upon what constitutes a “gateway” issue that courts may resolve. Howsam v. 
Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 537 U.S. 79, 83-86 (2002). 
9 First Options, 514 U.S. at 944. 
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default rule and to reallocate a greater share of decisionmaking authority to the 
arbitrator. 
 Such express delegation clauses are rather uncommon. As Chris Drahozal 
and I have documented in our empirical research of several different arbitration 
databases, most arbitration agreements do not use such delegation clauses.10 Far 
more common is a related phenomenon in which the parties incorporate 
institutional rules that attempt to accomplish the same result – allocating to the 
arbitrator the authority to resolve challenges to her jurisdiction.11 (I return to the 
implications of Rent-A-Center for these sorts of cases in Part III.) 
 The Court held that the delegation clause reallocated the authority to the 
arbitrator to resolve challenges to the underlying arbitration agreement. Critical to 
its conclusion, the Court conceptualized the parties’ contract as containing two 
different agreements: (1) the arbitration agreement, and (2) the delegation clause.  
This notion expanded the separability doctrine, a principle of federal law, even 
though there was no extrinsic evidence that the parties in Rent-A-Center intended 
to “separate” the delegation clause from the arbitration agreement.12 In other 
words, by consenting to arbitration, the parties were opting into this expanded 
separability rule even though they had never agreed upon it. 
 Through this “bifurcation” of the parties’ contract (effectively a 
“trifurcation” in cases of single contracts containing both arbitration clauses and 
delegation clauses13), the Court could isolate the residual role played by courts 
with respect to the arbitration clause’s enforceability. That is, courts could only 
resolve challenges to the validity of the delegation clause itself. Otherwise, all 
other disputes (both those relating to the arbitration agreement and those relating to 
                                                 
10 See Drahozal, supra note 2. 
11 Id. 
12 See Buckeye Check Cashing, 546 U.S. at 445. Though oft forgotten, it is worth recalling 
that Prima Paint, the case originally articulating the separability doctrine, conceptualized it 
as a default rule that the parties could override by contract. See Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood 
& Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 402-403 (1967).   
13 Put another way, the Court announced a principle of double separability. 
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the underlying claims) would be resolved by the arbitrator. Judicial oversight of 




 Stolt-Nielsen involved an arbitration clause in a standard charter party.  
Like most arbitration agreements, the arbitration clause was silent as to many 
procedural matters. Among other things, according to a stipulation between the 
parties, the arbitration clause did not expressly address whether arbitration could 
proceed on a classwide basis. Following some early procedural wrangling, the 
parties agreed to let the tribunal decide whether the agreement permitted classwide 
arbitration. The arbitrators concluded that it did.14 
 The issue of classwide arbitration was not entirely new to the Court.  
Several years earlier, in Green Tree Finance v. Bazzle, the Court considered 
whether an arbitrator had the authority to order classwide arbitration in a case 
where the arbitration agreement was silent on the matter.15 The case yielded a 
fractured opinion, but a majority of the Court in Bazzle appeared to recognize the 
possibility that arbitration could proceed on a classwide basis. In the wake of that 
decision, a number of arbitral institutions, including the American Arbitration 
Association (“AAA”), established procedures for administering classwide 
arbitration. By the time Stolt-Nielsen reached the Court, the American Arbitration 
Association had already administered over two hundred classwide arbitrations.16 
 Though raising an important issue, Stolt-Nielsen was an unusual case in 
several respects. For one thing, the case involved commercial parties, whereas 
many cases examining the relationship between arbitration and class actions 
                                                 
14 Stolt-Nielson v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., No. 80-1198, slip op. at 4 (2d Cir. April 27, 
2010).  
15 Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Bazzle, 539 U.S. 444, 447 (2003).  
16 David S. Clancy & Matthew M.K. Stein, An Uninvited Guest: Class Arbitration and the 
Fed. Arbitration Act’s Legislative History, 63 BUS. LAW. 55, 56 (2007).  
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involved disputes between companies and consumers. Furthermore, the case 
involved an agreement that was silent on the issue of classwide arbitration. In the 
wake of Bazzle, parties to arbitration agreements had new reason to address the 
matter explicitly. They sometimes did so through bans on classwide arbitration 
(with a severability clause in case the class waiver is found unenforceable), though 
the empirical record is mixed on how frequently parties utilized such clauses or 
otherwise addressed classwide arbitration in their agreements.17 
 The Court announced two broad holdings. First, it held that the arbitrator 
lacked the power to order classwide arbitration in the face of a silent agreement 
(thereby departing from the view of the Bazzle plurality).18 Second, it held that this 
departure supplied a ground for vacating the arbitral award (an interim award 
finding that the arbitration could proceed on a classwide basis).19 The Court relied 
principally on Section 10(a)(4) of the Federal Arbitration Act under which a court 
may vacate an award “where the arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so 
imperfectly executed them that a mutual, final, and definite award upon the subject 
matter submitted was not made.”20 In a rather cryptic footnote, the Court also 
indicated that, to the extent the “manifest disregard of the law” doctrine supplied 
an independent ground for vacating awards, the arbitrator’s conduct in this case 
constituted manifest disregard as well.21 
 This section has provided the essential background on the two cases and 
placed them in doctrinal and empirical context. The next section develops a 
normative theory for evaluating the decisions. 
 
                                                 
17 Drahozal, supra note 2; Christopher R. Drahozal & Quentin R. Wittrock, Is There a 
Flight from Arbitration?, 37 HOFSTRA L. REV. 71, 106-109 (2008); Theodore Eisenberg et 
al., Arbitration’s Summer Soldiers: An Empirical Study of Arbitration Clauses in 
Consumer and Nonconsumer Contracts 41 Univ. Mich. J. L. Reform 871 (2008).  
18 Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 130 S. Ct. 1758 (2010). 
19 Id. 
20 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(4). 
21 Stolt-Nielsen S.A., 130 S. Ct. at 1768 n.3. 
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 As noted in the introduction, both Rent-A-Center and Stolt-Nielsen supply 
platforms by which one can think about the relationship between arbitration and 
contract theory. Both cases lie at the intersection of contractual freedom and 
gapfilling.22 Rent-A-Center concerns the limits on parties’ freedom to agree on a 
matter, but that contractual freedom is analyzed against the backdrop of two 
important default rules (the First Options rule and the principle of separability).  
Stolt-Nielsen concerns gapfilling in cases where the parties’ agreement is 
incomplete, but that gapfilling question occurs against the backdrop of principles 
of contractual freedom (namely, what authority the parties are granting to the 
arbitrator through their mutual commitment to arbitrate). Here, I defend a 
normative view that endorses a strong form of procedural contractual freedom and 
a strong form of arbitral authority to fill gaps in parties’ procedural contracts.  
 
A. Contractual Freedom 
 
 Contract theory can teach us something about why societies enforce 
contracts. One theory focuses on the relationship between autonomy and 
contract.23 Contracting is simply an expression of our autonomous preferences – 
what we buy, how we alienate our labor and, in this context, how we resolve our 
disputes. By enforcing contracts, the state is validating our expressions of 
autonomy. 
                                                 
22 For a thoughtful article that approaches these issues from another perspective- namely 
whether the Supreme Court’s arbitration jurisprudence faithfully applies contract 
principles, see Lawrence A. Cunningham, Rhetoric versus Reality in Arbitration 
Jurisprudence:How the Supreme Court Flaunts (and Flunks) Contracts (and Why 
Contracts Teachers Need Not Teach the Cases), 61 Duke L. J. __ (forthcoming 2011).  
23  MICHAEL J. TREBILCOCK, THE LIMITS OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT 241-244 (Harvard 
Univ. Press, 1997) (1993); RANDY E. BARNETT, PERSPECTIVES ON CONTRACT LAW (Aspen 
Law & Business 3d ed. 2005) (1995); Randy E. Barnett, A Consent Theory of Contract, 86 
COLUM. L. REV. 269, 309 (1986).  
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 An alternative theory grounds contractual freedom in notions of social 
welfare. Enforcing promises is a socially desirable goal, not simply for the benefits 
derived by the individual, but also for the net increase in social wealth.24 Consider 
a variety of transactions ranging from a home purchase to the sale of goods. Each 
of these transactions yields an array of benefits, including the development of 
communities, the employment of individuals producing the goods, the downstream 
production of other goods using the factors of production, etc. All of these 
transactions, however, entail various degrees of risk – risk of sequencing (i.e., 
whether payment must be made before the goods are produced) and time (i.e., if 
payment precedes delivery, how long is the buyer out of pocket?). Robust 
enforceable contract rules facilitate such transactions (and the consequent rise in 
social wealth) by reducing the risks and uncertainties associated with them. If the 
buyer knows that he can be made whole in the event that the seller fails to deliver 
the promised goods, he will be more willing to part with his capital up front. 
 The choice among theoretical bases has important implications. For 
example, notions of contractual freedom grounded in autonomy will support 
enforcement of contracts even when they do not produce a net gain in social 
welfare. Consider, for example, contracts for prostitution or contracts to alienate 
one’s labor at an amount below minimum wage. Even if these contracts arguably 
produce some benefits for the individual, they produce externalities (in the case of 
prostitution) or a potential decrease in social welfare (by reducing the wage at 
which labor will be alienated). By contrast, notions of contractual freedom 
grounded in social welfare will support the enforcement of contracts even when 
doubts may arise about the expression of an individual’s will. Consider, for 
example, the unconscionability doctrine. Courts will impose a high standard before 
declaring a contract unconscionable – not because the contract represents a good 
                                                 
24  MICHAEL J. TREBILCOCK, THE LIMITS OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT 244-248 (Harvard 
Univ. Press 1997) (1993); Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, Enforcing Promises: An 
Examination of the Basis of Contract, 89 YALE L.J. 1261, 1265 (1980); Alan Schwartz & 
Robert E. Scott, Contract Theory and the Limits of Contract Law, 113 YALE L.J. 541, 569 
(2003).  
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deal for the individual in the inferior bargaining position (it well may not) but 
rather because the social costs of invalidating the contract are so great that they 
outweigh the impact to the individual party. For example, if a court declares a 
front-end fee on a credit card unconscionable, that may end up resulting in higher 
interest rates spread across a broader array of users. 
 These general theories of contractual freedom resonate in the specific 
context of procedural contracts. Both autonomy theory and social welfare theory 
can help justify a strong form of procedural contractual freedom.25 Under the 
autonomy theory, procedural contractual freedom makes sense as a manifestation 
of a party’s preference about how to resolve a dispute – whether in the form of 
resolution (settlement, mediation, arbitration or litigation.)26 According to the 
social welfare hypothesis, procedural contract freedom supports the parties’ efforts 
to reduce their “process costs;” that is, the parties choose the form of dispute 
resolution that maximizes their net welfare (the benefits of the particular form of 
dispute resolution less process costs).27 
 Regardless of the proper theory of contractual freedom, each theory faces a 
counterargument. The autonomy theory is often met with complaints that it fails to 
account for limitations on one of the contracting parties. These limitations may 
take the form of either unequal bargaining positions (that is, a party’s preferences 
are formed but she is effectively unable to manifest them in the contract – adhesion 
contracts providing the most obvious example) or bounded rationality (where, a 
party’s preferences are themselves skewed because he does not know what is in his 
best interest – taking out term-life insurance on a newborn child). The social 
                                                 
25 The Supreme Court’s very recent decision in AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, No. 
09-893 (Apr. 27, 2011), released just as this essay was going to press, rests on these 
theoretical underpinnings to support a strong form of procedural contractual freedom. 
26 Lon L. Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARV. L. REV. 353 (1978); 
Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073, 1078 (1984). 
27 Keith N. Hylton, Agreements to Waive or Arbitrate Legal Claims: An Econ. Analysis, 8 
SUP. CT.  ECON. REV. 209, 213 (2000); See Stephen J. Ware, Paying the Price of Process: 
Judicial Regulation of Consumer Arbitration Agreements, 2001 J. DISP. RESOL. 89 (2001). 
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welfare theory is often met with complaints that it fails to account for distributional 
disparities in the perceived social benefits. For example, arbitration clauses are 
often defended on the ground that they reduce the costs of resolving disputes 
(“process costs”) and those savings are passed onto the other party (the customer 
or the employee). While theoretically coherent, that account assumes a certain 
elasticity. To the extent the consumer or employee lacks a meaningful choice 
among goods or services in a given market, so the argument goes, the company can 
retain the benefits without passing them along (technically, if the benefits are not 
passed onto the consumers or employees, they inure to the benefit of the ultimate 




 Contract theory can also teach us something about gapfiliing and 
incomplete contracts. Incomplete contracts typically arise from either excess 
contracting costs or the parties’ bounded rationality. Most accounts start with the 
unremarkable premise that the purpose behind gapfilling is to effectuate the likely 
intent of the parties if they had originally sought to regulate the matter in their 
contract.28 While seemingly uncontroversial, this theoretical account is not entirely 
bug-free. One problem is the difficulty in discerning the intent of the parties.29 The 
parties may well have left a matter unregulated in their contract precisely because 
they did not think about it. Another peril is the risk of post-hoc rationalizations.30  
The need for gapfilling arises precisely in situations where parties have a dispute 
                                                 
28 See, e.g., Omri Ben-Shahar, A Bargaining Power Theory of Default Rules, 109 COLUM. 
L. REV. 396, 396 (2009); Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete 
Contracts:  An Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87, 93 (1989). 
29 See, e.g., Ben-Shahar, supra note 28; Richard A. Posner, The Law and Economics of 
Contract Interpretation, 83 TEXAS L. REV. 1581, 1586 (2005).  
30 George M. Cohen, The Negligence- Opportunism Tradeoff in Contract Law, 20 
HOFSTRA L. REV. 941, 946 (1992); Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Strategic Contractual 
Inefficiency and the Optimal Choice of Legal Rules, 101 YALE L.J. 729, 731 (1992); Ian 
Ayres, Menus Matter, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 3, 6 (2006); Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, 
Majoritarian vs. Minoritarian Defaults, 51 STAN. L. REV. 1591, 1592 (1999). 
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over the meaning of their contract. Once that dispute arises, of course, the parties 
naturally have an incentive to rationalize their positions based on their present 
interests (rather than attempt to approximate their interests at the time of 
contracting). Finally, attempting to reconstruct the parties’ intentions raises a third 
set of problems – namely the incentive effects.31  Excessive judicial gapfilling may 
have the unfortunate effect of encouraging either contractual laziness or, worse, 
strategic omissions by parties. 
 In response to some of the perceived weaknesses in the “effectuate the 
parties’ intent” approach, an alternative theory conceptualizes gapfilling in terms 
of penalty default rules. Penalty default rules operate to incentivize one party to a 
transaction to regulate the matter explicitly in the transaction or, otherwise, suffer 
the negative consequences of silence.32 Economically, the penalty default rule is 
typically imposed on the cheapest cost avoider, that is, the party who can regulate 
the matter contractually in the most efficient manner.33 In the context of 
contractual gapfilling, penalty default rules operate in a manner not unlike the 
contra preferentem doctrine – except here we are not construing ambiguous terms 
against the drafter; instead we are construing silence against the interest of the 
party who can most efficiently regulate that silence through greater contractual 
specificity. 
 The general contract theory on gapfilling has important implications for 
procedural contractual freedom but necessitates an important modification. In the 
context of a procedural contract (like an arbitration agreement), the need to fill 
gaps is just as present as in a substantive context, but the court’s role is more 
                                                 
31 See, e.g., Frederick W. Lambert, Path Dependent Inefficiency in the Corporate Contract: 
The Uncertain Case with Less Certain Implications, 23 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1077, 1129-33 
(1998). 
32 Ayres & Gertner, supra note 28, at 95-108; Russell Korobkin, The Status Quo Bias and 
Contract Default Rules, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 608, 617-622 (1998); Gregory Klass, Intent 
to Contract, 95 VA. L. REV. 1437, 1461-68 (2009).  
33 Dennis Patterson, The Pseudo-Debate over Default Rules in Contract Law, 3 S. CAL. 
INTERDISC. L.J. 235, 253-58 (1993); Cohen, supra note 30. 
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constrained. Compared to ordinary gapfilling in a substantive contract, procedural 
contractual gapfilling concerns two layers of analysis – (1) what is the proper 
gapfilling term and (2) who is the proper entity to decide the matter (by contrast in 
the substantive context, it is taken as a given that courts will perform the second-
listed function). By opting into arbitration and including a set of arbitral rules, the 
parties effect a choice as to that second question. By giving effect to that choice, 
courts vindicate the strong form of procedural contractual freedom. By contrast, 
when courts override the arbitrator’s decision about how to fill a gap in the parties’ 




 This section builds on the theoretical account developed in the preceding 
subsection. It critically applies the theory to the issues at stake in Rent-A-Center 
and Stolt-Nielsen. When viewed through the same lens (namely, the relationship 
between procedural contractual freedom and procedural contractual gapfilling), the 
two decisions stand in some tension. This section also considers the implications of 
that critical account on other issues presenting the same theoretical quandaries. 
 
A. Procedural Contractual Freedom 
 
 Viewed against the framework developed in the preceding section, Rent-A-
Center was rightly decided. It vindicated the parties’ freedom to regulate how 
challenges to their arbitration agreement would be resolved. From the perspective 
of autonomy, the decision bolstered private choice. From the perspective of social 
welfare, the decision provided a predictable enforcement regime to such contracts 
that can have the salubrious effect of reducing process costs, namely the costs of 
resolving challenges to the enforceability of the arbitration clause that can retard 
completion of the arbitration. 
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 Here, the objection may be raised, as it is raised against strong form 
normative views of contractual freedom generally, that one of the parties (in Rent-
A-Center the employee) is neither engaging in an autonomous choice nor  deriving 
any benefit from the net increase in social welfare generated by enforcement of the 
delegation clause.34 Both forms of this argument, however, suffer from major 
difficulties. The autonomy-based criticism undermines the autonomy of the 
employee more severely than enforcement of the agreement. It rests on the premise 
that the employee does not know what is good for himself (or herself), so the 
objective manifestation of his (or her) intentions cannot be trusted. But where does 
that leave us? Even accepting the validity of the premise, it presupposes that there 
is some other, more reliable manifestation of the employee’s preferences than his 
or her own agreement. Yet how those preferences are to be identified, who shall 
vindicate them and how one overcomes the post hoc rationalization problems are 
all difficulties that defenders of the autonomy-based criticism cannot overcome. 
 A deeper flaw with the autonomy-based criticism is that it has no logical 
stopping point. Even assuming that the consent to the delegation clause was not 
within the employee’s preference set, there is a clearer case that the employee was 
assenting to arbitration at the time he signed the agreement. Indeed, Rent-A-Center 
presents an especially strong case for that proposition because, as already noted, 
the arbitration agreement was a separate document from the employment 
application and required an independent signature manifesting the applicant’s 
assent. Yet if we cannot trust that the assent to the delegation clause represented an 
autonomous choice, is there any more reason to trust the assent to the arbitration 
clause? The short answer is “no,” for the same basic reason – the autonomy-based 
critique to Rent-A-Center lacks any independently derived alternative for 
measuring the expressed preferences of the employee. 
                                                 
34 Schwartz, supra note 4. 
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 Of course, the employee (or more generally the party in the inferior 
bargaining position) is not entirely without protection. The precise purpose of the 
First Options default rule is to compel at least one party (here Rent-A-Center) to 
make an explicit choice to reallocate decisionmaking authority to the arbitrator. In 
this respect, the First Options default rule operates as a sort of judicially imposed 
gapfilling provision allocating kompetenz to the court absent an express 
manifestation of procedural contractual freedom by the parties. 
 
B. Procedural Contractual Gapfilling 
 
 Viewed against the background developed in Part II, Stolt-Nielsen was 
wrongly decided. By deferring to the tribunal’s decision to allow arbitration to 
proceed on a classwide basis, the Court in Stolt-Nielsen would have been 
reaffirming the principles of autonomy and social welfare that underpinned the 
strong normative defense of procedural contractual freedom sustaining Rent-A-
Center. Instead, by revisiting that decision, the Court undermined the very values 
that it sought to promote in Rent-A-Center. 
 Here, it will naturally be objected that the procedural decision by the 
arbitrators – namely to allow the arbitration to proceed on a classwide basis – was 
an exceptional one. Even accepting that the arbitrators have some procedural 
discretion, so one would object, surely that discretion is not limitless, and when it 
concerns as core a matter as the identity of the parties to the arbitration, the 
tribunal exceeds its power and, thus, is subject to correction. That was the essence 
of Justice Alito’s argument in the last part of the Court’s opinion.35 
 There is a tempting seductiveness to this argument, but it ultimately is 
unpersuasive. Centrally, it bears emphasis that the parties to the class arbitration 
were all in some sort of contractual privity including an arbitration agreement.  
There was no suggestion in Stolt-Nielsen that any of the purported users of the 
                                                 
35 Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 130 S. Ct. 1758, 1776 (2010). 
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charter party had entered into an agreement lacking an arbitration clause. In other 
words, no one was being forced to arbitrate against his or her will. Rather, the 
tribunal was simply making the reasonable procedural decision to consolidate 
proceedings into a single, manageable one rather than a sprawling, multi-
proceeding one – not unlike the sort of discretionary procedural decision that a 
federal court or the panel on multidistrict litigation undertakes. 
 The arbitration clause presents one complicating factor on the particular 
facts of this case. That is, unlike many arbitration clauses, the arbitration clause in 
this case neither specified the applicable rules (effectively making the case an ad 
hoc arbitration) nor expressly accorded to the tribunal the power to resolve 
procedural gaps in the parties’ agreement. Nonetheless, the nature of the 
submission agreement in this case overcomes that problem. As every member of 
the Court recognized, the parties expressly submitted the class arbitration question 
to the arbitrators, effectively aligning it with the more common practice of vesting 
the arbitrators with the power to resolve procedural issues unaddressed by the 
parties’ agreement (at least as to the class arbitration question). 
 Apart from the crabbed view the Stolt-Nielsen court takes of the 
arbitrator’s discretion (and more broadly) the parties’ procedural contractual 
freedom, the decision suffers from a deeper flaw. For its conception of gapfilling 
authority rests on a power of judicial review that sits uneasily with the Federal 
Arbitration Act. Recall the grounds for the Court’s decision to vacate the award.  
Putting aside the confusing and unfortunate dicta on manifest disregard of the law, 
the Court ultimately rested its decision in Section 10(a)(4) of the Federal 
Arbitration Act. Here it is important to state that ground in full: the court may 
order vacatur of the award “where the arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so 
imperfectly executed them that a mutual, final, and definite award upon the subject 
matter submitted was not made.”36 Read closely, Section 10(a)(4) actually sets 
                                                 
36 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(4). 
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forth two grounds – (a) exceeding the powers and (b) imperfectly executing the 
powers. Moreover, the section contains the unusual phrase “that a mutual, final, 
and definite award upon the subject matter submitted was not made.” It is far from 
clear whether this phrase modifies only the second ground or, instead, both 
grounds. The Court’s decision presumes the first interpretation of the section but 
nowhere justifies it. Nor does it attempt to articulate the difference between 
“exceeding powers” and “so imperfectly executing” them. The Court has 
instructed elsewhere that statutory terms must be construed in a manner so as to 
give each term an independent meaning.37 Applying that canon here, the two terms 
must be designed to describe different sorts of errors. 
 Regardless of the proper scope of Stolt-Nielsen regarding the arbitrator’s 
gapfilling authority, the decision has potentially far-reaching implications for its 
views about judicial review of arbitral awards. The Court’s formal reliance on 
Section 10(a)(4) breathes new life into a provision of the FAA that, until the 
Court’s decision, had largely been a dead letter in federal arbitration practice.38 Its 
alternative holding, resting on the manifest disregard doctrine, resurrected an 
ongoing debate39 over whether the “manifest disregard” doctrine represents an 
independent ground for vacating an award (as the Court had suggested in dicta in 
two prior decisions40) or, instead, merely represents a short-hand reference to the 
Section 10 grounds generally (as the Court had recently suggested in dicta in 
another, more recent decision).41 
                                                 
37 Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 364 (2000) (stating that it is a cardinal rule of statutory 
construction to give effect to every clause and word of a statute).  
38 Peter B. Rutledge et al., United States, in PRACTITIONER’S HANDBOOK ON 
INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION (Frank-Bernd Weigand ed., Oxford Univ. 
Press 2d ed. 2009). 
39 Richard A. Bales & MyLinda Kay Sims, Much Ado About Nothing: The Future of 
Manifest Disregard After Hall Street, 62 S.C. L. REV. (forthcoming 2011); Griffin Toronjo 
Pivateau, Reconsidering Arbitration: Evaluating the Future of the Manifest Disregard 
Standard, 21 SOUTHERN L.J. (forthcoming 2011). 
40 Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 436-437 (1953); First Options of Chi., Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 
U.S. 938 (1995). 
41 Hall Street Assocs., L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576, 584-586 (2008).  For exemplary 
circuit court decisions grappling with whether the manifest disregard doctrine remains an 
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 Here, it is worth considering the relative consequences of the conceptions 
of judicial review articulated in Rent-A-Center and Stolt-Nielsen. Rent-A-Center 
involves an effort by one party to seek judicial intervention before arbitral 
proceedings have taken place; Stolt-Nielsen involves an effort by one party to seek 
judicial intervention after arbitral proceedings have taken place42 (following an 
unsuccessful attempt to invoke judicial assistance at the agreement stage).  
Between the two sorts of attempts to invoke judicial assistance, the intervention 
undertaken in Stolt-Nielsen works a greater cost in terms of party welfare. It 
effectively forces the parties to endure all the sunk costs of the initial arbitration 
and then, following vacatur of the award, start over (albeit on an individualized 
basis). By contrast, from a social welfare perspective, judicial intervention in Rent-
A-Center at least had the advantage of minimizing the parties’ sunk costs by 
determining the delegation question before the arbitration had meaningfully 
proceeded. 
 In sum, Rent-A-Center and Stolt-Nielsen thus sit uncomfortably alongside 
each other. Rent-A-Center rested on a strong notion of freedom of contract, but that 
notion depended critically on a gapfilling rule (double separability) to which 
neither party agreed. By contrast, Stolt-Nielsen took a narrow view of arbitral 
gapfilling and, thereby, also took a crabbed view of the parties’ freedom to allocate 
procedural decisionmaking to the arbitrator. The next subsection examines the 
implications of that tension. 
 
                                                                                                                            
independent vacatur ground following Hall Street, see e.g., Citigroup Global Mkts, Inc. v. 
Bacon, 562 F.3d 349, 352-54 (5th Cir. 2009); Comedy Club, Inc. v. Improv West Assoc., 
553 F.3d 1277, 1289-91 (9th Cir. 2009); Lagstein v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s, 
London, 607 F.3d 634, 641 (9th Cir. 2010).  
42 Technically, the intervention occurs at an interim or preliminary stage. As noted above, 
the tribunal in Stolt-Nielsen issued an interim award on jurisdiction which enabled the 
parties to bring a vacatur action. While tribunals sometimes render awards of this sort, 
nothing compelled them to do so. In some cases, tribunals may pretermit interim 
jurisdictional awards until they have heard decisions on the merits.  See Peter B. Rutledge, 
Decisional Sequencing 62 ALA. L. REV. 1 (2010). 





 The preceding subsection illustrated the wisdom of the result in Rent-A-
Center, the error of Stolt-Nielsen and the underlying tension between the two 
decisions. This subsection considers the implications of that uneasy tension for 
other issues percolating in the lower courts and in academic literature. 
 Collectively, the two decisions create significant uncertainty over how 
courts should resolve issues of contract and kompetenz where the underlying issue 
involves the interpretation of arbitral rules incorporated by reference.43 In both the 
delegation context and the procedural gapfilling context, those rules play a central 
role. 
 Begin with the Rent-A-Center situation. Most leading institutional rules in 
the United States, including both the commercial rules of the American Arbitration 
Association and the arbitration rules of JAMS, contain provisions that attempt to 
accomplish a result similar to those sought in delegation clauses. Rule 7(a) of the 
AAA Commercial Arbitration Rules is exemplary: 
 
The arbitrator shall have the power to rule on his or her own 
jurisdiction, including any objections with respect to the 
existence, scope or validity of the arbitration agreement.44 
 
Such rules raise the question of whether they, like delegation clauses, supply the 
“clear and unmistakable evidence” of the parties’ intent to override the default rule 
in First Options. This issue is at least debatable. On the one hand, the reasoning in 
Stolt-Nielsen would suggest that, unlike delegation clauses, these sorts of 
provisions do not explicitly appear in the parties’ agreement but instead merely are 
                                                 
43 In this respect, both cases were poor candidates for review by the Court because neither 
contract expressly incorporated institutional rules, a common norm in procedural contracts.  
See Drahozal, supra note 2. 
44 American Arbitration Association, Commercial Arbitration Rules and Mediation 
Procedures, R-7 (June 1, 2009), available at http://www.adr.org/sp.asp?id=22440#R7. 
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incorporated by reference. On the other hand, the reasoning in Rent-A-Center 
would suggest that such provisions aim to accomplish precisely the same result as 
delegation clauses; moreover, as a matter of contract law generally and arbitration 
law specifically, parties are routinely bound by contractual terms that they 
incorporate by reference. The overwhelming view among the federal courts is that 
such provisions, incorporated by reference, supply the “clear and unmistakable 
evidence” required by First Options.45 Yet the tensions between Rent-A-Center and 
Stolt-Nielsen throw this area of law into doubt. 
 Now consider the Stolt-Nielsen situation. Most rules contain general 
provisions affording the arbitrator maximum discretion to fill gaps in procedural 
matters where the arbitration agreement is silent. For example, consider Article 
16(1) of the International Center for Dispute Resolution (“ICDR”)Rules: 
 
Subject to these Rules, the tribunal may conduct the 
arbitration in whatever manner it considers appropriate, 
provided that the parties are treated with equality and that 
each party has the right to be heard and is given a fair 
opportunity to present its case.  
 
Other rules are to similar effect.46   
 Such rules again raise the question of what exactly the parties have 
delegated to the arbitrator. Under the reasoning of Rent-A-Center, the delegation 
could be considered a broad one, according them to resolve the discretion over any 
                                                 
45 E.g., Contec Corp. v. Remote Solution Co., Ltd., 398 F.3d 205, 208 (2d Cir. 2005); 
Terminix Int'l Co., L.P. v. Palmer Ranch L.P., 432 F.3d 1327, 1332 (11th Cir. 2005); FSC 
Sec. Corp. v. Freel, 14 F.3d 1310, 1312-13 (8th Cir. 1994); Apollo Computer, Inc. v. Berg, 
886 F.2d 469, 473 (1st Cir. 1989). 
46 Jonathan L. Frank & Julie Bedard, Electronic Discovery in Int’l Arbitration: Where 
Neither the IBA Rules nor U.S. Litig. Principles are Enough, 62 DISP. RESOL. J. 62, 69 
(2007) (stating that both article 15(1) of the UNCITRAL rules and LCIA Article 14 
providing the arbitrator the “widest discretion” are similar to ICDR rule 16(1)).  
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procedural matters not expressly addressed by the parties’ contract. Under the 
reasoning of Stolt-Nielsen, by contrast, courts must police the application of such 
clauses to ensure that the arbitrator does not “exceed” her power. 
 Of course, the impact of Stolt-Nielsen for such cases depends on whether 
lower courts lay stress on the majority’s language about how the choice to arbitrate 
implicates a decision about the identity of parties with whom one will arbitrate. If 
that is correct, though, Stolt-Nielsen still sits uncomfortably alongside the 
jurisprudence involving arbitration against non-signatories (a topic that the Court 
had only recently addressed before it decided Stolt-Nielson).47 Indeed, if Stolt-
Nielsen is correct, then it is hard to see how arbitrations involving nonsignatories 
to the arbitration agreement (whether involving nonsignatory claimants or 
defendants) can remain good law. Unlike the class arbitration at issue in Stolt-
Nielsen, the parties there are not even in contractual privity, and at least one party 
is being forced to arbitrate against another party with whom it has not entered into 




 Rent-A-Center and Stolt-Nielsen represent important contributions by the 
Court to the evolving jurisprudence of arbitration. When viewed through the lens 
of contract theory, however, the two decisions sit uncomfortably alongside each 
other.  One decision reflects a strong form of contractual freedom and envisions a 
limited role for judicial intervention. The other takes an unduly crabbed view of 
the arbitrators’ gapfilling authority despite the parties’ mutual intention to 
arbitrate. Until the Court unravels the knots created by these two opinions, the 
tensions in their underlying reasoning threaten to inject an unfortunate uncertainty 
into arbitration jurisprudence. 
                                                 
47 See Arthur Anderson LLP v. Carlisle, 129 S.Ct. 1896 (2009).   
